-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- __________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN Vulnerabilities in Sendmail December 5,1997 20:00 GMT Number G-43a ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: There are two vulnerabilities in sendmail. The first vulnerability is a resource starvation problem and the second is a buffer overflow problem. PLATFORM: Systems running any version of sendmail up to and including sendmail 8.7.5. DAMAGE: By exploiting these vulnerabilities, a local user can obtain root access. SOLUTION: Apply the patches and/or workarounds provided in the bulletin below. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY These vulnerabilities are widely known. ASSESSMENT: ______________________________________________________________________________ [Appended to G-43 on December 5,1997 with additional patch information from Sun Microsystems, Inc.] [Begin CERT Bulletin] ============================================================================= CERT(sm) Advisory CA-96.20 Original issue date: September 18, 1996 Last revised: -- Topic: Sendmail Vulnerabilities - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ *** This advisory supersedes CA-95:05 *** The CERT Coordination Center has received reports of two security problems in sendmail that affect all versions up to and including 8.7.5. By exploiting the first of these vulnerabilities, users who have local accounts can gain access to the default user, which is often daemon. By exploiting the second vulnerability, any local user can gain root access. The CERT/CC team recommends installing vendor patches or upgrading to the current version of sendmail (8.7.6). Until you can do so, we urge you to apply the workaround provided in Sec. III.C. In all cases, be sure to take the extra precautions listed in Sec. III.D. For beta testers of sendmail 8.8: The vulnerabilities described in this advisory have been fixed in the beta version. We will update this advisory as we receive additional information. Please check advisory files regularly for updates that relate to your site. In addition, you can check ftp://info.cert.org/pub/latest_sw_versions/sendmail to identify the most current version of sendmail. - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ I. Description There are two vulnerabilities in all versions of sendmail up to and including sendmail 8.7.5. The first vulnerability is a resource starvation and the second is a buffer overflow problem. Resource Starvation ------------------- When email is forwarded to a program using a .forward file or an :include: statement within a .forward or alias file, that program is executed as the owner of the .forward file or the file referenced by the :include: statement. Similarly, if email is forwarded to a file, that file is opened as the owner of the .forward file or the file referenced by the :include: statement. The file owner is called the "controlling user." If the message cannot be delivered immediately, the name of the controlling user is written into the queue file along with the other delivery information so that the appropriate permissions can be acquired when the mail queue is processed. Only the name of the controlling user is written in the queue file. This name is derived by calling the system routine getpwuid(3) on the user id of the file owner. If getpwuid fails, the sendmail default user (defined by the DefaultUser option in 8.7 and by the "u" and "g" options in older releases) is assumed. In some cases, the system can be forced into resource starvation, thus forcing getpwuid(3) to fail even though an entry exists in /etc/passwd corresponding to that uid. Since getpwuid has no way of portably returning an error meaning "resource failure" as distinct from "user id not found," sendmail has no way of distinguishing between these cases; it assumes that the uid is unknown and falls back to the default user. By starving sendmail of specific resources, sendmail will create files owned by the default user. Once created, these files can be used to access other files owned by the default user. In addition, these files owned by the default user can be used to leverage access to other privileged users on the system. Buffer Overflows ---------------- There are several buffer overflows present in sendmail version 8.7.5 and earlier. Some of the buffer overflows could result in local users gaining unauthorized root access. Significant work has been done on sendmail version 8.8 (now in beta test) to eliminate the problem, and the code changes originally planned for 8.8 have been backported to 8.7.6 to address these vulnerabilities. II. Impact Resource Starvation ------------------- Anyone with access to an account on the system can run programs or write files as the default user. The danger of compromising the default user depends primarily on the other files in your system owned by that user. For example, on many systems the line printer spool directory (e.g., /var/spool/lpd) is owned by daemon; because the line printer subsystem runs setuid root, it may be possible to gain additional privileges. However, some other systems have no files owned by user daemon on the default system, and the only files owned by group daemon are not writable by that group; hence, the danger is minimal. Buffer Overflows ---------------- Anyone with access to an account on the system can gain root access. III. Solution Install a patch from your vendor if one is available (Sec. A) or upgrade to the current version of sendmail (Sec. B). Until you can take one of those actions, we recommend applying the workaround described in Sec. C. This workaround addresses the resource starvation problem but not buffer overflows. In all cases, you should take the precautions listed in Sec. D. Note to beta testers of sendmail 8.8: The vulnerabilities described in this advisory have been fixed in the beta version of 8.8. A. Install a vendor patch. Below is a list of the vendors who have provided information about sendmail. Details are in Appendix A of this advisory; we will update the appendix as we receive more information. If your vendor's name is not on this list, please contact the vendor directly. Digital Equipment Corporation Hewlett-Packard Company IBM Corporation Linux Open Software Foundation The Santa Cruz Operation Silicon Graphics Inc. Sun Microsystems, Inc. B. Upgrade to the current version of sendmail. Install sendmail 8.7.6. This version is a "drop in" replacement for 8.7.x. There is no patch for 8.6.x. If you are using version 8.6 or earlier, you need to upgrade to the current version and rebuild your sendmail.cf files. Upgrading to version 8.7.6 addresses both vulnerabilities described in this advisory. Sendmail 8.7.6 is available from ftp://ftp.sendmail.org/ucb/src/sendmail/sendmail.8.7.6.tar.gz ftp://info.cert.org/pub/tools/sendmail/sendmail.8.7.6.tar.gz ftp://ftp.cert.dfn.de/pub/tools/net/sendmail/sendmail.8.7.6.tar.gz MD5 (sendmail.8.7.6.tar.gz) = 4a1f2179c53c9106bc8d7738f4d55667 Also in that directory are .Z and .sig files. The .Z file contains the same bits as the .gz file, but is compressed using UNIX compress instead of gzip. The .sig is Eric Allman's PGP signature for the uncompressed tar file. The key fingerprint is Type bits/keyID Date User ID pub 1024/BF7BA421 1995/02/23 Eric P. Allman Key fingerprint = C0 28 E6 7B 13 5B 29 02 6F 7E 43 3A 48 4F 45 29 Eric P. Allman Eric P. Allman Eric P. Allman Eric P. Allman We strongly recommend that when you change to a new version of Sendmail you also change to the configuration files that are provided with that version. Significant work has been done to make this task easier. It is now possible to build a sendmail configuration file (sendmail.cf) using the configuration files provided with the sendmail release. Consult the cf/README file for a more complete explanation. Creating your configuration files using this method makes it easier to incorporate future changes to sendmail into your configuration files. Finally, for Sun users, a paper is available to help you convert your sendmail configuration files from the Sun version of sendmail to one that works with sendmail version 8.7.x. The paper is entitled "Converting Standard Sun Config Files to Sendmail Version 8" and was written by Rick McCarty of Texas Instruments Inc. It is included in the distribution and is located in contrib/converting.sun.configs. C. Apply a workaround. Resource Starvation ------------------- Eric Allman, the author of sendmail, has provided the following workaround to the resource starvation vulnerability. Using smrsh as "prog" mailer limits the programs that can be run as the default user. Smrsh does not limit the files that can be written, but less damage can be done by writing files directly. The damage can be almost entirely constrained by ensuring that the default user is an innocuous one. Sendmail defaults to 1:1 (daemon) only because that is reasonably portable. A special "mailnull" account that is used only for this purpose would be better. This user should own no files and should have neither a real home directory nor a real shell. A sample password entry might be: mailnull:*:32765:32765:Sendmail Default User:/no/such/dir:/dev/null A corresponding entry should be made in /etc/group: mailnull:*:32765: These assume that there are no other users or groups with id = 32765 on your system; if there are, pick some other unique value. After creating this user, change the line in /etc/sendmail.cf reading O DefaultUser=1:1 to read O DefaultUser=mailnull If you are running 8.6.*, you will have to change the lines reading Ou1 Og1 to read Ou32765 Og32765 Finally, if you are using the m4(1)-based sendmail configuration scheme provided with sendmail 8.7.*, you should add the following line to the m4 input file, usually named sendmail.mc: define(`confDEF_USER_ID', 32765:32765) The actual values should, of course, match those in the passwd file. Buffer Overflows ---------------- There is no workaround for the buffer overflow problem. To address this problem, you must apply your vendor's patches or upgrade to the current version of sendmail (version 8.7.6). D. Take additional precautions. Regardless of which solution you apply, you should take these extra precautions to protect your systems. * Use the sendmail restricted shell program (smrsh) With *all* versions of sendmail, use the sendmail restricted shell program (smrsh). You should do this whether you use vendor-supplied sendmail or install sendmail yourself. Using smrsh gives you improved administrative control over the programs sendmail executes on behalf of users. A number of sites have reported some confusion about the need to continue using the sendmail restricted shell program (smrsh) when they install a vendor patch or upgrade to a new version of sendmail. You should always use the smrsh program. smrsh is included in the sendmail distribution in the subdirectory smrsh. See the RELEASE_NOTES file for a description of how to integrate smrsh into your sendmail configuration file. smrsh is also distributed with some operating systems. * Use mail.local If you run /bin/mail based on BSD 4.3 UNIX, replace /bin/mail with mail.local, which is included in the sendmail distribution. It is also included with some other operating systems distributions, such as FreeBSD. Although the current version of mail.local is not a perfect solution, it is important to use it because it addresses vulnerabilities that are being exploited. For more details, see CERT advisory CA-95:02. Note that as of Solaris 2.5 and beyond, mail.local is included with the standard distribution. To use mail.local, replace all references to /bin/mail with /usr/lib/mail.local. If you are using the M4(1)-based configuration scheme provided with sendmail 8.X, add the following to your configuration file: define(`LOCAL_MAILER_PATH', /usr/lib/mail.local) * WARNING: Check for executable copies of old versions of mail programs If you leave executable copies of older versions of sendmail installed in /usr/lib (on some systems, it may be installed elsewhere), the vulnerabilities in those versions could be exploited if an intruder gains access to your system. This applies to sendmail.mx as well as other sendmail programs. Either delete these versions or change the protections on them to be non-executable. Similarly, if you replace /bin/mail with mail.local, remember to remove old copies of /bin/mail or make them non-executable. - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Appendix A - Vendor Information Below is a list of the vendors who have provided information for this advisory. We will update this appendix as we receive additional information. If you do not see your vendor's name, please contact the vendor directly. Digital Equipment Corporation ============================= [About the resource starvation problem] Source: Software Security Response Team Copyright (c) Digital Equipment Corporation 1996. All rights reserved. 08.SEP.1996 At the time of writing this document, patches (binary kits) for Digital's UNIX related operating systems are being developed. Digital will provide notice of availability for remedial kits through AES services (DIA, DSNlink FLASH), placed in the public FTP patch service domain and also be available from your normal Digital Support channel. ftp://ftp.service.digital.com/public/{OS/{vn.n} | | | |--version |--osf or ultrix 9/96 - DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORPORATION Hewlett-Packard Company ======================= [About the resource starvation problem] HP-UX is vulnerable, and a patch is in progress. The HP SupportLine Mail Service provides notification of security patches for HP-UX to its 'security_info' mailing list. For information on the service, send mail to support@us.external.hp.com with 'help' in the body of the message (without quotes). To report new security defects in HP software, send mail to security-alert@hp.com. IBM Corporation ================ The following APARs are being developed and will be available shortly. See the appropriate release below to determine your action. AIX 3.2 ------- Apply the following fixes to your system: APAR - IX61303 IX61307 AIX 4.1 ------- Apply the following fixes to your system: APAR - IX61162 IX61306 To determine if you have this APAR on your system, run the following command: instfix -ik IX61162 IX61306 AIX 4.2 ------- Apply the following fixes to your system: APAR - IX61304 IX61305 To determine if you have this APAR on your system, run the following command: instfix -ik IX61304 IX61305 To Order -------- APARs may be ordered using Electronic Fix Distribution (via FixDist) or from the IBM Support Center. For more information on FixDist, http://service.software.ibm.com/aixsupport/ or send e-mail to aixserv@austin.ibm.com with a subject of "FixDist". IBM and AIX are registered trademarks of International Business Machines Corporation. Linux ===== [For the resource starvation problem:] Debian Linux: not vulnerable (uses smail) Red Hat and derivatives: ftp://ftp.redhat.com/pub/redhat-3.0.3/i386/updates/RPMS/sendmail* Open Software Foundation ======================== OSF's OSF/1 R1.3.2 is not vulnerable to these types of attacks described in the resource starvation sections of the advisory. OSF's OSF/1 R1.3.2 is vulnerable to the buffer overflow problems. We will address the problem in our next maintenance release. The Santa Cruz Operation ======================== Any SCO operating system running a version of sendmail provided by SCO is vulnerable to this problem. SCO is providing Support Level Supplement (SLS) oss443a for the following releases to address this issue: SCO Internet FastStart release 1.0.0 SCO OpenServer releases 5.0.0 and 5.0.2 This SLS provides a pre-release version of sendmail release 8.7.6 for these platforms. SCO hopes to have a final version of sendmail 8.7.6 available to address both issues mentioned in this advisory in the near future. Note that only SCO Internet FastStart uses sendmail as the default mail system. All other SCO operating systems use other mail systems such as the Multi-Channel Memorandum Distribution Facility (MMDF) or the "mailsurr" mail system as the default, and as such are not vulnerable to this problem unless otherwise configured to use sendmail. SCO intends to provide a similar patch for SCO UnixWare release 2.1.0 in the near future. When configured to use a version of sendmail provided by SCO, releases prior to the ones mentioned here are also vulnerable, but no plans have yet been made concerning patches for these earlier releases. You can download SLS oss443a as shown below. Anonymous ftp (World Wide Web URL) ------------- ftp://ftp.sco.COM/SSE/oss443a (SLS image) ftp://ftp.sco.COM/SSE/oss443a.ltr.sse (cover letter/install notes) Compuserve ---------- SLS oss443a is also available in the SCO Forum on Compuserve. SCO Online Support (SOS) BBS ---------------------------- SLS oss443a can also be downloaded interactively via X, Y, or Z MODEM or Kermit, using the SCO Online Support System (SOS). Follow the menu selections under "Toolchest" from the main SOS menu. The phone numbers available for interactive transfer from SOS are: 1-408-426-9495 (USA) +44 (0)1923 210 888 (United Kingdom) Checksums --------- sum -r ------ 13804 630 oss443a 35304 14 oss443a.ltr.sse MD5 --- MD5 (oss443a) = 549260a71ca76f4e98dd38bccb72748c MD5 (oss443a.ltr.sse) = 7475d83f0db64a1af69eb66cd392a9d3 Be sure to keep track of the README file at ftp://ftp.sco.COM/SSE/README for updates to this supplement. If you have further questions, contact your support provider. If you need to contact SCO, please send electronic mail to support@sco.COM, or contact SCO as follows. USA/Canada: 6am-5pm Pacific Daylight Time (PDT) ----------- 1-800-347-4381 (voice) 1-408-427-5443 (fax) Pacific Rim, Asia, and Latin American customers: 6am-5pm Pacific ------------------------------------------------ Daylight Time (PDT) 1-408-425-4726 (voice) 1-408-427-5443 (fax) Europe, Middle East, Africa: 9am-5:30pm Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) ---------------------------- +44 (0)1923 816344 (voice) +44 (0)1923 817781 (fax) Silicon Graphics, Inc. ====================== We are analyzing the vulnerability, and will provide additional information as it becomes available. Sun Microsystems, Inc. ====================== Sun is working on a patch which will fix both problems, and we expect to have it out by the end of the month. Also, we will send out a Sun bulletin on this subject at about the same time. - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ - - The CERT Coordination Center staff thanks Eric Allman, the author of sendmail, for his extensive assistance with this advisory, Wolfgang Ley of DFN-CERT for his support in the development of the advisory, and D. J. Bernstein of the University of Illinois at Chicago for reporting the resource starvation vulnerability. - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ [End CERT Bulletin] [Append Sun Microsystems, Inc. Bulletin] ______________________________________________________________________________ Sun Microsystems, Inc. Security Bulletin Bulletin Number: #00159 Date: December 3, 1997 Cross-Ref: Title: V8 Sendmail for SunOS(tm) 4.1.4 and 4.1.3_U1 ______________________________________________________________________________ The information contained in this Security Bulletin is provided "AS IS." Sun makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect to the information contained in this Security Bulletin. ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONDITIONS, REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES, INCLUDING ANY WARRANTY OF NON-INFRINGEMENT OR IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED AND EXCLUDED TO THE EXTENT ALLOWED BY APPLICABLE LAW. IN NO EVENT WILL SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC. BE LIABLE FOR ANY LOST REVENUE, PROFIT OR DATA, OR FOR DIRECT, SPECIAL, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, INCIDENTAL OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES HOWEVER CAUSED AND REGARDLESS OF ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF THE USE OF OR INABILITY TO USE THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SECURITY BULLETIN, EVEN IF SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC. HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. If any of the above provisions are held to be in violation of applicable law, void, or unenforceable in any jurisdiction, then such provisions are waived to the extent necessary for this disclaimer to be otherwise enforceable in such jurisdiction. ______________________________________________________________________________ 1. Bulletins Topics Sun announces the release of patches for SunOS 4.1.4 and 4.1.3_U1 containing the same version of sendmail included with SunOS 5.x: V8.6.9 plus extensions. SunOS 4.1.4 and 4.1.3_U1 originally included V5 sendmail. Sun recommends that customers using sendmail on SunOS 4.1.4 and 4.1.3_U1 install the patches listed in section 4 below to take advantage of security and other enhancements found in V8 sendmail. 2. Understanding What is Available sendmail is a public domain utility based on SMTP, which provides internetwork mail routing. SunOS 4.1.4 and 4.1.3_U1 originally included version 5 of the public domain sendmail with Sun enhancements. Various security related improvements were made to subsequent versions of the public domain sendmail. These improvements were included in the version of sendmail that Sun provides with SunOS 5.x, V8.6.9; in addition, Sun's version includes enhancements to address subsequently identified security vulnerabilities. The patches listed in section 4 below provide this same version of Sun sendmail for SunOS 4.1.4 and 4.1.3_U1 customers. 3. Support for Sun's sendmail The patches listed in section 4 below are covered by Sun's normal support policy. Sun's V5 sendmail is currently covered by Sun's normal support policy. However, with this release of V8 sendmail for SunOS 4.1.4 and 4.1.3_U1. Sun will cease to update V5 patches after May 31, 1998. Patches affected are 102423-xx for SunOS 4.1.4 and 101665-xx for SunOS 4.1.3_U1. 4. List of Patches Sun's most current version of sendmail is provided for SunOS 4.1.4 and 4.1.3_U1 via these patches: OS version Patch ID ______________ _________ SunOS 4.1.4 105466-01 SunOS 4.1.3_U1 105465-01 ______________________________________________________________________________ APPENDICES A. Patches listed in this bulletin are available to all Sun customers via World Wide Web at: B. Checksums for the patches listed in this bulletin are available via World Wide Web at: C. Sun security bulletins are available via World Wide Web at: D. Sun Security Coordination Team's PGP key is available via World Wide Web at: E. To report or inquire about a security problem with Sun software, contact one or more of the following: - Your local Sun answer centers - Your representative computer security response team, such as CERT - Sun Security Coordination Team. Send email to: security-alert@sun.com F. To receive information or subscribe to our CWS (Customer Warning System) mailing list, send email to: security-alert@sun.com with a subject line (not body) containing one of the following commands: Command Information Returned/Action Taken _______ _________________________________ help An explanation of how to get information key Sun Security Coordination Team's PGP key list A list of current security topics query [topic] The email is treated as an inquiry and is forwarded to the Security Coordination Team report [topic] The email is treated as a security report and is forwarded to the Security Coordinaton Team. 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This Security Bulletin may be reproduced and distributed, provided that this Security Bulletin is not modified in any way and is attributed to Sun Microsystems, Inc. and provided that such reproduction and distribution is performed for non-commercial purposes. [End Append Sun Microsystems, Inc. Bulletin] ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Eric Allman, the author of sendmail, Wolfgang Ley of DFN-CERT, D. J. Bernstein of the University of Illinois at Chicago, and CERT for the information contained in this bulletin. ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. 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LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC) G-33: rdist vulnerability G-34: HP-UX Vulnerabilities (netttune, SAM remote admin) G-35: SUN Microsystems Solaris vold Vulnerability G-36: HP-UX Vulnerabilities in elm and rdist Programs G-37: Vulnerability in Adobe FrameMaker (fm_fls) G-38: Linux Vulnerabilities in mount and umount Programs G-39: Vulnerability in expreserve G-40: SGI admin and user Program Vulnerabilities G-41: Vulnerability in BASH Program G-42: Vulnerability in WorkMan Program -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 4.0 Business Edition iQCVAwUBNIhvn7nzJzdsy3QZAQHgKAP8CsyIZtoU6Aawlj7H+rMxcK+XBWVpsJmI sHcOW99P6UbS06muAvZBPpu6HDzydy/KMP0Lmq+Tpn8HfrluZUbr20hJXqZXfY3D 7vo9S6hoFONj1mbR72OZOL/76Cz0E3d1UxMfyPuzI5JUuV0GMTupw/zPTA2u2xg5 ZLAA/bzaVOA= =f0kb -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----