-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- [ For Public Release ] __________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN SGI IRIX webdist.cgi, handler and wrap programs Vulnerabilities "Update to webdist.cgi in Bulletin H-53" August 29, 1997 16:00 GMT Number H-102 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: Vulnerabilites exist in programs provided with the Outbox Environment subsystem. These are the cgi-bin programs webdist.cgi, handler and wrap. PLATFORM: All SGI systems with the Outbox subsystem. IRIX 5.x and 6.x. DAMAGE: Utilizing these vulnerabilities, arbitrary commands can be executed with httpd daemon privileges. Each of these vulnerabilities can be exploited remotely. SOLUTION: Apply patches or workarounds listed below. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue following ASSESSMENT: steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems. ______________________________________________________________________________ [ Start Silicon Graphics Inc. Advisory ] - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory Title: IRIX webdist.cgi, handler and wrap programs Title: CERT Advisory CA-97.12, AUSCERT Advisory AA-97.14 Number: 19970501-02-PX Date: August 26, 1997 ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible. Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto, express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory. ______________________________________________________________________________ - ------------------------ - ---- Issue Specifics --- - ------------------------ Several programs provided with the Outbox Environment subsystem have been found to be insecure. These are the cgi-bin programs webdist.cgi, handler and wrap available for IRIX 5.x and 6.x. Each of these programs can be manipulated to execute arbitrary commands with potentially elevated privileges. Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems. This issue will be corrected in future releases of IRIX. - --------------- - ---- Impact --- - --------------- In general, the Outbox subsystem is install by default on all SGI systems starting with IRIX 6.2. However, IRIX 5.x and pre-IRIX 6.2 systems may have the Outbox subsystem as part of the Desktop software package. For these particular vulnerabilities, a local account is not required. Furthermore, each of these vulnerabilities can be exploited remotely. Utilizing these vulnerabilities, arbitrary commands can be executed with httpd daemon privileges. Depending on configuration of the http server, privileged access may be possible. This issue has been publically disclosed and discussed in several public forums including the BUGTRAQ mailing list in addition to security advisories CERT CA-97.12 and AUSCERT AA-97.14 - ----------------------- - ---- Software Check --- - ----------------------- To determine if the Outbox software is installed on a particular system, the following command can be used: % /usr/sbin/versions outbox.sw I = Installed, R = Removed Name Date Description I outbox 03/23/97 Outbox Environment, 1.2 I outbox.sw 03/23/97 Outbox End-User Software, 1.2 I outbox.sw.outbox 03/23/97 Outbox Software Tools, 1.2 I outbox.sw.webdist 03/23/97 Web Software Distribution Tools, 1.2 In the above case, the Outbox software is installed and the steps in either the "Temporary Solution" or "Solution" section should be completed. - --------------------------- - ---- Temporary Solution --- - --------------------------- Although patches are available to address the vulnerabilities in these programs, it is realized that there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may not be possible. Below, two possible solutions are provided to remove the vulnerabilities. In Solution A program permissions are changed while in Solution B the Outbox subsystem is removed. Either solution can be used depending on site requirements. Solution A - Change program permissions. The steps below can be used to remove the vulnerabilities by removing the permissions of the vulnerable programs. The default installation places these files in /var/www/cgi-bin, however, all cgi-bin directories on a system should be checked for these programs. 1) Become the root user on the system. % /bin/su - Password: # 2) Change the permissions on the programs. # /bin/chmod 400 /var/www/cgi-bin/webdist.cgi # /bin/chmod 400 /var/www/cgi-bin/handler # /bin/chmod 400 /var/www/cgi-bin/wrap ************ *** NOTE *** ************ By changing the permissions on these programs as above, these programs can not be executed by any user. 3) Return to previous level. # exit $ Solution B - Removal of the Outbox software. 1) Become the root user on the system. % /bin/su - Password: # 2) Remove the vulnerable outbox subsystem. # /usr/sbin/versions -v remove outbox 3) Return to previous level. # exit $ - ----------------- - ---- Solution --- - ----------------- OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions ---------- ----------- ------- ------------- IRIX 3.x no IRIX 4.x no IRIX 5.0.x no IRIX 5.1.x no IRIX 5.2 no IRIX 5.3 yes 2315 IRIX 6.0.x yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 6.1 yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 6.2 yes 2314 IRIX 6.3 yes 2338 IRIX 6.4 yes 2338 NOTES 1) upgrade operating system or see "Temporary Solution" section. Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider. The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Security information and patches can be found in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectfully. ##### Patch File Checksums #### The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files: Filename: README.patch.2315 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 25011 11 README.patch.2315 Algorithm #2 (sum): 39892 11 README.patch.2315 MD5 checksum: 9B5B74574022FEE0259307C44A4602C0 Filename: patchSG0002315 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 44474 2 patchSG0002315 Algorithm #2 (sum): 48055 2 patchSG0002315 MD5 checksum: 0C9FA667D42B3FC6895C5AD612CE4FB1 Filename: patchSG0002315.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 27036 3 patchSG0002315.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 23448 3 patchSG0002315.idb MD5 checksum: 3DEEA538437CC5D96488269715948F31 Filename: patchSG0002315.outbox_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 38552 35 patchSG0002315.outbox_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 34937 35 patchSG0002315.outbox_sw MD5 checksum: 0655A31A55306B4272FD00796CF69466 Filename: README.patch.2314 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 10949 11 README.patch.2314 Algorithm #2 (sum): 39885 11 README.patch.2314 MD5 checksum: E2BFB467EF18F1D5B5CDCE5FBDC3F36D Filename: patchSG0002314 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 18667 2 patchSG0002314 Algorithm #2 (sum): 51210 2 patchSG0002314 MD5 checksum: FE7C82E22CD63CC278C011FE80F3265A Filename: patchSG0002314.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 23116 3 patchSG0002314.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 23091 3 patchSG0002314.idb MD5 checksum: CB3E71D4FB3D86192E15EE59AED8A296 Filename: patchSG0002314.outbox_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 56643 35 patchSG0002314.outbox_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 28391 35 patchSG0002314.outbox_sw MD5 checksum: 5CC76625AB89FF2862EB21111E7924F0 Filename: README.patch.2338 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 39046 13 README.patch.2338 Algorithm #2 (sum): 48961 13 README.patch.2338 MD5 checksum: D568381EF9948399D50663C2CB9175E8 Filename: patchSG0002338 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 41914 3 patchSG0002338 Algorithm #2 (sum): 15225 3 patchSG0002338 MD5 checksum: 18845B0651DC6CCED5E92694915DB36D Filename: patchSG0002338.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 32107 4 patchSG0002338.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 19674 4 patchSG0002338.idb MD5 checksum: 351DFB48864622C3B8219CC88526F5BE Filename: patchSG0002338.outbox_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 36841 107 patchSG0002338.outbox_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 12878 107 patchSG0002338.outbox_sw MD5 checksum: 2269AB01C700BB39E1CCF1849FAC70AF - ------------------------- - ---- Acknowledgments --- - ------------------------- Silicon Graphics wishes to thank the CERT Coordination Center, and AUSCERT for their assistance in this matter. - ------------------------------------------------------------ - ---- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts --- - ------------------------------------------------------------ If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely available to any person needing the information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web. The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches, respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please contact your SGI support provider. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web (http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email to SGI as outlined below. % mail wiretap-request@sgi.com subscribe wiretap end ^d In the example above, is the email address that you wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are finished composing the mail message. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. ------oOo------ For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A support contract is not required for submitting a security report. ______________________________________________________________________________ This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and includes its valid PGP signature. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNAOdcLQ4cFApAP75AQEggQP9GCHJnOvD+zZq/8sekupSCK4aaIWFlpqh OsuLG9IeieNF42ePHMe0C/odHg1grg/FdLdnY0Pgg5SocR3acOEzsPxhEPnNOFwo Q358tu3G2tndxM2ULwVrw+COl3naWZYzwOyWPEjxfTI1VwId7/Tq3gUQ3vhuxVYI 8km5METDoJE= =KOAH - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [ End Silicon Graphics Inc. Advisory ] ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Silicon Graphics Inc. for the information contained in this bulletin. ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 510-422-8193 FAX: +1 510-423-8002 STU-III: +1 510-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites, and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM - 8AM PST), call the CIAC voice number 510-422-8193 and leave a message, or call 800-759-7243 (800-SKY-PAGE) to send a Sky Page. CIAC has two Sky Page PIN numbers, the primary PIN number, 8550070, is for the CIAC duty person, and the secondary PIN number, 8550074 is for the CIAC Project Leader. Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://ciac.llnl.gov/ Anonymous FTP: ciac.llnl.gov (198.128.39.53) Modem access: +1 (510) 423-4753 (28.8K baud) +1 (510) 423-3331 (28.8K baud) CIAC has several self-subscribing mailing lists for electronic publications: 1. CIAC-BULLETIN for Advisories, highest priority - time critical information and Bulletins, important computer security information; 2. CIAC-NOTES for Notes, a collection of computer security articles; 3. SPI-ANNOUNCE for official news about Security Profile Inspector (SPI) software updates, new features, distribution and availability; 4. SPI-NOTES, for discussion of problems and solutions regarding the use of SPI products. Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package called Majordomo, which ignores E-mail header subject lines. To subscribe (add yourself) to one of our mailing lists, send the following request as the E-mail message body, substituting ciac-bulletin, ciac-notes, spi-announce OR spi-notes for list-name: E-mail to ciac-listproc@llnl.gov or majordomo@tholia.llnl.gov: subscribe list-name e.g., subscribe ciac-notes You will receive an acknowledgment email immediately with a confirmation that you will need to mail back to the addresses above, as per the instructions in the email. This is a partial protection to make sure you are really the one who asked to be signed up for the list in question. If you include the word 'help' in the body of an email to the above address, it will also send back an information file on how to subscribe/unsubscribe, get past issues of CIAC bulletins via email, etc. PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC) H-93: SGI IRIX ordist Buffer Overrun Vulnerability H-94: Vulnerability in ps H-95: Vulnerability in x-lock H-96: Vulnerability in Bind H-92a: HP-UX X11/Motif Lib and Novell Netware Vulnerabilities H-97: SGI IRIX ftpd Signal Handling Vulnerability H-98: SunOS automounter Vulnerability H-99: SunOS, Solaris ifconfig ioctls Vulnerability H-100: SunOS, Solaris libXt Vulnerability H-101: FreeBSD procfs Vulnerability -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 4.0 Business Edition iQCVAwUBNAcGPbnzJzdsy3QZAQFjtgP9ElhbF/uJmFN1GfL4qg+TDHujuHoTKXWN RZ51IWCiMk5c8norWLuF9KTU9ha6lBkJgOrixSvOmFOTklUyi1/aPdskRbAdYB6W VfYF3Yu5dirIxcFVwlIsE4QNA20M00FN49Y+aq8WD2gN49g3zcUXm3/3chkCB5mH YtQf7JEUbUo= =pfpc -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----