-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- __________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN Solaris 2.x CDE sdtcm_convert Vulnerability February 24, 1997 19:00 GMT Number H-36 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: A vulnerability exists in the sdtcm_convert utility. PLATFORM: All platforms with Solaris 2.x Common Desktop Environment (CDE) DAMAGE: This vulnerability may allow local users to gain root privileges. SOLUTION: Until patches are available, take the steps outlined in Section 3 as soon as possible. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY Exploit details involving this vulnerability have been made ASSESSMENT: publicly available. ______________________________________________________________________________ [ Start AUSCERT Advisory ] =========================================================================== AA-97.08 AUSCERT Advisory Solaris 2.x CDE sdtcm_convert vulnerability 24 February 1997 Last Revised: -- - ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- AUSCERT has received information that a vulnerability exists in the Solaris 2.x Common Desktop Environment (CDE) sdtcm_convert utility. This vulnerability may allow local users to gain root privileges. Exploit information involving this vulnerability has been made publicly available. AUSCERT recommends that sites take the steps outlined in section 3 as soon as possible. - ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. Description sdtcm_convert(1) is a calendar data conversion utility which converts between version 3 and version 4 calendar data formats. During the execution of sdtcm_convert, files are modified with root privileges in an insecure manner. By manipulating the files that sdtcm_convert is accessing, local users may change the ownership of arbitrary files on the system. This may be leveraged to gain root privileges. sdtcm_convert is part of the Solaris 2.x Common Desktop Environment (CDE) Applications package, SUNWdtdst. Sites can determine whether the SUNWdtdst package is installed with the command: % pkginfo -l SUNWdtdst The long listing (-l) from pkginfo will also give the version of the CDE package installed. The default location for sdtcm_convert is /usr/dt/bin/sdtcm_convert. 2. Impact Local users may be able to change the ownership of arbitrary files on the system. This may be leveraged to gain root privileges. 3. Workarounds/Solution Official vendor patches have been released by Sun Microsystems which address this vulnerability (Section 3.1). Until the patches recommended by Sun Microsystems can be applied, AUSCERT recommends that sites limit the possible exploitation of this vulnerability by immediately removing the setuid permissions as stated in Section 3.2. 3.1 Install vendor patches Sun Microsystems has released security patches which address the vulnerability described in this advisory. AUSCERT recommends that sites apply these patches as soon as possible. Patches have been released for: CDE version Patch MD5 ~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1.0.1 sparc 103671-02.tar.Z abb42a75b89c16e085d0f8811eeede10 1.0.2 sparc 103670-02.tar.Z e9f8f34deaaf215ff5f5b632bf0d45ea 1.0.1 x86 103718-02.tar.Z cebb82a95592392359f5206fe2a63ed1 1.0.2 x86 103717-02.tar.Z 18fe28c03abdf118b647fd347261089e Sites with SunService Contracts may obtain these patches through their local SunSolve Online server. For sites without a SunService Contract, the above security patches may be retrieved from: ftp://sunsolve1.sun.com.au/pub/outgoing/ Note that this site is currently the only public area where these patches are available. 3.2 Remove setuid permissions To prevent the exploitation of the vulnerability described in this advisory, AUSCERT recommends that the setuid permissions be removed from sdtcm_convert immediately. As the sdtcm_convert program will no longer work for non-root users, it is recommended that the execute permissions also be removed. For example: # ls -l /usr/dt/bin/sdtcm_convert -r-sr-sr-x 1 root daemon 285700 Feb 24 12:20 /usr/dt/bin/sdtcm_convert # chmod 500 /usr/dt/bin/sdtcm_convert -r-x------ 1 root daemon 285700 Feb 24 12:20 /usr/dt/bin/sdtcm_convert 4. Additional measures Most Unix systems ship numerous programs which have setuid or setgid privileges. Often the functionality supplied by these privileged programs is not required by many sites. The large number of privileged programs that are shipped by default are to cater for all possible uses of the system. AUSCERT encourages sites to examine all the setuid/setgid programs and determine the necessity of each program. If a program does not absolutely require the setuid/setgid privileges to operate (for example, it is only run by the root user), the setuid/setgid privileges should be removed. Furthermore, if a program is not required at your site, then all execute permissions should be removed. A sample command to find all setuid/setgid programs is (run as root): # find / \( -perm -4000 -o -perm -2000 \) -type f -exec ls -l {} \; It is AUSCERT's experience that many vulnerabilities are being discovered in setuid/setgid programs which are not necessary for the correct operation of most systems. Sites can increase their security by removing unnecessary setuid/setgid programs. For example, the functionality provided by the sdtcm_convert program is not needed by many sites. If sites had previously disabled sdtcm_convert, they would not have been vulnerable to this latest exploit. [ End AUSCERT Advisory ] ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of AUSCERT, Marko Laakso (University of Oulu), CERT/CC, DFN-CER and Sun Microsystems for the information contained in this bulletin. ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 510-422-8193 FAX: +1 510-423-8002 STU-III: +1 510-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites, and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM - 8AM PST), call the CIAC voice number 510-422-8193 and leave a message, or call 800-759-7243 (800-SKY-PAGE) to send a Sky Page. CIAC has two Sky Page PIN numbers, the primary PIN number, 8550070, is for the CIAC duty person, and the secondary PIN number, 8550074 is for the CIAC Project Leader. Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://ciac.llnl.gov/ Anonymous FTP: ciac.llnl.gov (128.115.19.53) Modem access: +1 (510) 423-4753 (28.8K baud) +1 (510) 423-3331 (28.8K baud) CIAC has several self-subscribing mailing lists for electronic publications: 1. 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A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC) H-26: FreeBSD setlocale() Vulnerability H-27: HP-UX vgdisplay Buffer Overrun Vulnerability H-28: SGI IRIX startmidi/stopmidi Vulnerability H-29: HP-UX sendmail Patches Vulnerability H-30: Solaris ffbconfig Buffer Overrun Vulnerability H-31: HP-UX ppl executable Vulnerability H-32: HP-UX ppl Core Dump Vulnerability H-33: HP-UX ftpd/kftpd Vulnerability H-34: Vulnerability in innd H-35: HP-UX vgdisplay command Vulnerability RECENT CIAC NOTES ISSUED (Previous Notes available from CIAC) Notes 07 - 3/29/95 A comprehensive review of SATAN Notes 08 - 4/4/95 A Courtney update Notes 09 - 4/24/95 More on the "Good Times" virus urban legend Notes 10 - 6/16/95 PKZ300B Trojan, Logdaemon/FreeBSD, vulnerability in S/Key, EBOLA Virus Hoax, and Caibua Virus Notes 11 - 7/31/95 Virus Update, Hats Off to Administrators, America On-Line Virus Scare, SPI 3.2.2 Released, The Die_Hard Virus Notes 12 - 9/12/95 Securely configuring Public Telnet Services, X Windows, beta release of Merlin, Microsoft Word Macro Viruses, Allegations of Inappropriate Data Collection in Win95 Notes 96-01 - 3/18/96 Java and JavaScript Vulnerabilities, FIRST Conference Announcement, Security and Web Search Engines, Microsoft Word Macro Virus Update -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMxcUobnzJzdsy3QZAQHG4gP8Dw7qjMLfkiOoLiSxKVqFyOAq/2hXyX1N 2HEZqWGzOWWMva2Q/uYCZptKaueoSuxFgP9GMw0exXPxyrVRx2ilJt6m7NNIhrsY JwwxgMmWugO86tY+XccpUIPhYqjipiI/wtpDv2Gw7slQE4fGHCW23vY8LOSoDTxY vh1c8QQEA8E= =xG8O -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----