-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- [ For Public Release ] __________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN Solaris Solstice AdminSuite Vulnerabilities June 25, 1997 21:00 GMT Number H-75 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: Vulnerabilities exist in AdminSuite releases 2.1 and 2.2. PLATFORM: AdminSuite 2.1 and 2.2 DAMAGE: Local users may gain root access. SOLUTION: Apply vendor patches or use workaround as described in Section 5. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY Sun strongly recommends application of patches or workarounds ASSESSMENT: until release of AdminSuite 2.3. ______________________________________________________________________________ [ Start Sun Microsystems Advisory - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Sun Microsystems, Inc. Security Bulletin Bulletin Number: #00145 Date: June 25 1997 Cross-Ref: Title: Vulnerabilities with Solaris Solstice AdminSuite - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Permission is granted for the redistribution of this Bulletin, so long as the Bulletin is not edited and is attributed to Sun Microsystems. Portions may also be excerpted for re-use in other security advisories so long as proper attribution is included. Any other use of this information without the express written consent of Sun Microsystems is prohibited. Sun Microsystems expressly disclaims all liability for any misuse of this information by any third party. - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. Bulletins Topics Sun announces the release of patches for Solaris Solstice AdminSuite (AdminSuite) releases 2.1 and 2.2. Sun strongly recommends that you install the patches listed in section 4 immediately on every affected system. Sun also strongly recommends that you apply the additional measures listed in section 5 to correct permission problems that may exist with your NIS+ passwd table and NIS (YP) map source file. 2. Who is Affected Vulnerable: Sites using AdminSuite 2.1 and 2.2 The problems are fixed in AdminSuite 2.3. 3. Understanding the Vulnerabilities AdminSuite is a package which provides graphical user interfaces to perform various system administration tasks such as managing users, groups, and hosts. 3.1 Problems with AdminSuite 2.1 AdminSuite 2.1 uses excessive permissions when adding new users to the NIS+ passwd table. This allows users to change their password table entries to become root. This problem has been fixed in AdminSuite 2.2. AdminSuite 2.1 incorrectly changes the permissions on the source file used to build the NIS (YP) passwd map. As a result, it may be possible for any user to edit the /etc/passwd file. This problem has been fixed in AdminSuite 2.2. AdminSuite 2.1 creates temporary files in an insecure manner when updating a NIS (YP) database. As a result, it may be possible to manipulate AdminSuite into over-writing arbitrary files on the system including the NIS (YP) map source file. This problem has been fixed in AdminSuite 2.2. 3.2 Problems with AdminSuite 2.1 and 2.2 AdminSuite 2.1 and 2.2 creates lock files insecurely which may be exploited to gain root access. AdminSuite 2.1 and 2.2 Database Manager "save" option executes under setgid bin privileges for non-privileged users. This may be exploited by non-privileged users to gain root access. 4. List of Patches The vulnerabilities relating to AdminSuite 2.1 and 2.2 are fixed by the following patches: AdminSuite version Patch ID ------------------ -------- 2.1 (sparc) 103235-08 2.1 (x86) 103236-08 2.2 (sparc) 103502-04 2.2 (x86) 103503-03 5. Additional measures 5.1 AdminSuite 2.1 uses excessive permissions when adding new users to NIS+. The patch listed in section 5 fixes this problem. However, users that were created prior to the application of this patch may have excessive permissions. Therefore you should check the passwd table for entries with excessive permissions with a program such as the following: # awk program to check for NIS+ entries with excessive # permissions function readNlines(n) { for (i = n; i > 0; i--) getline } /Access.+ ....rmcd/ { readNlines(6) print substr($5, 2, length($5) - 2) } Put the program in a file and run it with the following command pipeline: % niscat -o '[]passwd.org_dir' | nawk -f and the name field of each passwd table entry with excessive permissions will be printed one per line on stdout. Note that the program only checks for the type of excessive permissions generated by the AdminSuite 2.1 problem described above. If the program above reveals entries with excessive permissions, then you can take a look at them with the following command: % niscat -o '[name=user]passwd.org_dir' One line of the output will look similiar to the following: Access Rights : ----rmcdr---r--- ^^^^ This allows the owner to read, modify, change, and delete information. The rights at this level should be more restrictive and they should be changed. To restore the permissions to what they were intended to be for one entry, do the following (you must have table modify permissions): % nischmod o=r,ngw-rmdc '[name=user]passwd.org_dir' Or for each entry in the whole table at once, do the following: % nischmod o=r,ngw-rmdc '[]passwd.org_dir' This sets the owner permissions to r (read) and removes all permissions from nobody, group, and world. Please note this will only change the permissions on a per-entry basis and will not change the table or column permissions. 5.2 AdminSuite 2.1 also incorrectly changes the permissions on the source file used to build the NIS (YP) passwd map. The patch listed in section 4 fixes this problem, but after installing the patch, you should verify that the passwd map source file has a file mode of 644 (or more restrictive, depending on your preferences), and is owned by root. 6. Checksum Table The checksum table below shows the BSD checksums (SunOS 5.x: /usr/ucb/sum), SVR4 checksums (SunOS 5.x: /usr/bin/sum), and the MD5 digital signatures for the above-mentioned patches that are available from: These checksums may not apply if you obtain patches from your answer centers. File Name BSD SVR4 MD5 - ---------------- ---------- --------- -------------------------------- 103235-08.tar.Z 56327 3360 46627 6719 B2B8E921C50311737EF53C1C9C47DFD2 103236-08.tar.Z 04175 2027 10154 4054 7FC98A5F8BFA44B884A55A1BED826BA3 103502-04.tar.Z 24231 954 10762 1907 CFE2B561C3D382A121F4E064635695D7 103503-03.tar.Z 32779 331 45751 662 1B80A52FC690FB7EA7D6E23524E65849 - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Sun acknowledges, with thanks, AUSCERT and Marko Laakso (University of Oulu, Finland) for their assistance in the preparation of this bulletin. Sun and AUSCERT are members of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams. For more information about FIRST, visit the FIRST web site at . - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- APPENDICES A. Patches listed in this bulletin are available to all Sun customers via World Wide Web at: Customers with Sun support contracts can also obtain patches from local Sun answer centers and SunSITEs worldwide. B. Sun security bulletins are available via World Wide Web at: C. To report or inquire about a security problem with Sun software, contact one or more of the following: - Your local Sun answer centers - Your representative computer security response team, such as CERT - Sun Security Coordination Team. Send email to: security-alert@sun.com D. To receive information or subscribe to our CWS (Customer Warning System) mailing list, send email to: security-alert@sun.com with a subject line (not body) containing one of the following commands: Command Information Returned/Action Taken ------- --------------------------------- help An explanation of how to get information key Sun Security Coordination Team's PGP key list A list of current security topics query [topic] The email is treated as an inquiry and is forwarded to the Security Coordination Team report [topic] The email is treated as a security report and is forwarded to the Security Coordinaton Team. Please encrypt sensitive mail using Sun Security Coordination Team's PGP key send topic A short status summary or bulletin. For example, to retrieve a Security Bulletin #00138, supply the following in the subject line (not body): send #138 subscribe Sender is added to our mailing list. To subscribe, supply the following in the subject line (not body): subscribe cws your-email-address Note that your-email-address should be substituted by your email address. unsubscribe Sender is removed from the CWS mailing list. - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- [ End Sun Microsystems Advisory ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Sun Microsystems, Inc., AUSCERT & Marko Laakso (University of Oulu, Finland) for the information contained in this bulletin. ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 510-422-8193 FAX: +1 510-423-8002 STU-III: +1 510-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites, and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM - 8AM PST), call the CIAC voice number 510-422-8193 and leave a message, or call 800-759-7243 (800-SKY-PAGE) to send a Sky Page. CIAC has two Sky Page PIN numbers, the primary PIN number, 8550070, is for the CIAC duty person, and the secondary PIN number, 8550074 is for the CIAC Project Leader. Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://ciac.llnl.gov/ Anonymous FTP: ciac.llnl.gov (198.128.39.53) Modem access: +1 (510) 423-4753 (28.8K baud) +1 (510) 423-3331 (28.8K baud) CIAC has several self-subscribing mailing lists for electronic publications: 1. CIAC-BULLETIN for Advisories, highest priority - time critical information and Bulletins, important computer security information; 2. CIAC-NOTES for Notes, a collection of computer security articles; 3. SPI-ANNOUNCE for official news about Security Profile Inspector (SPI) software updates, new features, distribution and availability; 4. SPI-NOTES, for discussion of problems and solutions regarding the use of SPI products. Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package called Majordomo, which ignores E-mail header subject lines. To subscribe (add yourself) to one of our mailing lists, send the following request as the E-mail message body, substituting ciac-bulletin, ciac-notes, spi-announce OR spi-notes for list-name: E-mail to ciac-listproc@llnl.gov or majordomo@tholia.llnl.gov: subscribe list-name e.g., subscribe ciac-notes You will receive an acknowledgment email immediately with a confirmation that you will need to mail back to the addresses above, as per the instructions in the email. This is a partial protection to make sure you are really the one who asked to be signed up for the list in question. If you include the word 'help' in the body of an email to the above address, it will also send back an information file on how to subscribe/unsubscribe, get past issues of CIAC bulletins via email, etc. PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC) H-65: SGI IRIX rld Security Vulnerability H-66: Vulnerability in suidperl (sperl) H-67: Red Hat Linux X11 Libraries Buffer Overflow H-68: Windows95 Network Password Vulnerability H-69: Vulnerability in getopt (3) H-70: Vulnerability in rpcbind H-71: Vulnerability in the at(1) program H-72: SunOS eeprom Vulnerability H-73: SunOS chkey Vulnerability H-74: Unix lpr Buffer Overrun Vulnerability -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 4.0 Business Edition iQCVAwUBM7LNrrnzJzdsy3QZAQFhhwP8C8Y03oUb+0wPDVuJxhp16bTFsqw6KagY BJimJeNZfMDp8WL59U5JQ0IlNb16bI8cIMpPfO2W71ULKT/kiiejHJBKbtRPDJ+v tvYrBjT1IQA1S5WRRTxfwOv8K2KQilAmguui1vyRMkbcdMub6TgKCzbmQgwAHWlw jFkckuLVoSU= =kZ6r -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----