************************************************************************** Security Bulletin 9608 DISA Defense Communications System March 14, 1996 Published by: DISN Security Coordination Center (SCC@NIC.DDN.MIL) 1-(800) 365-3642 DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEM NETWORK SECURITY BULLETIN The DISN SECURITY BULLETIN is distributed by the DISN SCC (Security Coordination Center) under DISA contract as a means of communicating information on network and host security exposures, fixes, and concerns to security and management personnel at DISN facilities. Back issues may be obtained via FTP (or Kermit) from NIC.DDN.MIL [192.112.36.5] using login="anonymous" and password="guest". The bulletin pathname is scc/sec-yynn (where "yy" is the year the bulletin is issued and "nn" is a bulletin number, e.g. scc/sec-9544.txt). These are also available at our WWW site, http://nic.ddn.mil. ************************************************************************** + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + ! ! ! The following important advisory was issued by the Automated ! ! Systems Security Incident Support Team (ASSIST) and is being ! ! relayed unedited via the Defense Information Systems Agency's ! ! Security Coordination Center distribution system as a means ! ! of providing DISN subscribers with useful security information. ! ! ! + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Automated Systems Security Incident Support Team _____ ___ ___ _____ ___ _____ | / /\ / \ / \ | / \ | | / Integritas / \ \___ \___ | \___ | | < et /____\ \ \ | \ | | \ Celeritas / \ \___/ \___/ __|__ \___/ | |_____\ <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Bulletin 96-07 Release date: March 13, 1996 6:30 PM EST (GMT -5) SUBJECT: Common Gateway Interface Vulnerability SUMMARY: Some C-language based Common Gateway Interface programs that call a shell to execute other programs can be tricked into executing any arbitrary command. This vulnerability is contained in ancillary, example software distributed with NCSA HTTPD and Apache HTTPD. Many World Wide Web sites have been built using these programs and hence may be vulnerable. ****************************************************************** THIS IS NOT AN HTTPD SERVER PROGRAM VULNERABILITY. Commercial HTTPD server products developed and sold by Netscape Communications Corporation, and IBM do not include this sample code on their distribution media. If you have purchased one of these products and have not installed any programs other than those on the distribution media, you are not vulnerable to this problem. Note, however, that if you previously had NCSA HTTPD or Apache HTTPD installed, you may have remnants of the installation left over which may be vulnerable. If you have purchased another commercial HTTPD server product, you may wish to contact your vendor to see if any action is necessary. ******************************************************************** BACKGROUND: A. Background Information Any CGI program built using the sample code distributed with NCSA HTTPD Version 1.5A-Export and earlier or Apache HTTPD Version 1.0.3 and earlier that accepts input from the user and passes that input as arguments to a shell command is subject to this vulnerability. B. Vulnerability Details NCSA HTTPD and Apache HTTPD, two of the most popular freely- available World Wide Web server implementations, come with several CGI programs that are compiled by the default build procedure. These programs, because they are meant to serve as examples, are frequently installed at a site even if they are not being used. Furthermore, because the source code for these programs is meant to be an example of how to implement CGI programs, it is frequently copied into other CGI programs as well. One of the utility functions offered by the CGI example source code is called escape_shell_cmd(). It is intended to help programmers avoid the vulnerability described above. This function, when given an input string received from the user, scans the string for characters that have special meaning to the UNIX shell, and inserts escapes in front of these characters to remove their special meaning. However, the list of special characters is incomplete. The CGI example source code also includes a program called "phf," which implements a form-based interface to a local CCSO Name Server. (The CCSO Name Server is a white pages service used for looking up name and address information about people.) The "phf" demonstration program uses the escape_shell_cmd() function to check its inputs, and is thus vulnerable to attack as described above. Any World Wide Web server host that has been configured to allow access to and execution of Common Gateway Interface programs and 1. Has installed the "phf" program from the NCSA HTTPD distribution or the Apache HTTPD distribution in a CGI-BIN directory (even if the program is not being used) and/or 2. Has installed programs that are using the escape_shell_cmd() function contained in the sample CGI-BIN source code distributed with NCSA HTTPD or Apache HTTPD and/or 3. Has installed CGI programs that do not adequately check their inputs for the special characters listed above (including newline) before passing these inputs to a shell command is vulnerable to attack in this manner. IMPACT: Many World Wide Web sites have been built using the CGI programs in question. Therefore, the potential security exposure may be widespread. An attacker who knows how to exercise this vulnerability may have the ability to: A. Execute arbitrary commands on the server host using the same user-id as the user running the "httpd" server. If "httpd" is being run as "root," the attacker's commands are also run as "root." B. Access any file on the system that is accessible to the user-id that is running the "httpd" server. If the "httpd" server user-id has read access to the file, the attacker can also read the file. If the "httpd" server user-id has write access to the file, the attacker can change or destroy the contents of the file. If the "httpd" server is being run as "root," the attacker can read, modify, or destroy any file on the server host. RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS: A. Suggested actions The ASSIST team recommends that you consider taking the following actions (subject to any licensing restrictions that may apply to your copies of the programs): 1. If you have installed the "phf" program from the NCSA or Apache HTTPD binary or source distributions and are not using it, REMOVE it or use the Monitoring script below (See Section B). 2. If you have installed the "phf" program from the NCSA or Apache HTTPD source distributions and are using it, apply one of the patches below, rebuild the "phf" program, and install the new version. 3. If you have installed the "phf" program from the NCSA or Apache HTTPD binary distributions and are using it, obtain the NCSA or Apache source distributions: NCSA: ftp://ftp.ncsa.uiuc.edu/Web/httpd/Unix/ncsa_httpd/ httpd_1.5/httpd_1.5a-export_source.tar.Z Apache: ftp://ftp.apache.org/apache/dist/apache_1.0.3.tar.gz Then apply one of the patches below, rebuild the "phf" program, and install the new version. 4. If you have installed other C-language CGI programs obtained from the Internet or elsewhere and have the source code for these programs, examine them closely and make sure that they are properly checking their inputs before passing them to a shell. If these programs are using the escape_shell_cmd() function from the NCSA or Apache distributions, the patches below can be adapted to these programs. 5. If you have developed your own C-language CGI programs using the sample code contained in the NCSA or Apache distributions, adapt the patches below to your code, rebuild these programs, and install the new versions. 6. If you have purchased CGI programs from third-party vendors, contact your vendor to determine whether or not these programs contain this vulnerability. 7. If you are running your "httpd" server as "root," seriously consider running it as an unprivileged user instead. B. Script to Monitor Unauthorized Use of the Phf Program The following script will monitor the usage of the cgi-bin phf program. It will give a small response to the person trying to use it and will notify you (or whomever's e-mail address you designate) of the fact that it was tried. #!/bin/sh # Provided by NAVCIRT # Basically modified cgi-test to be a phf replacement # navcirt@fiwc.navy.mil # Set this path to mail for your system MAIL=/bin/mail echo Content-type: text/html echo # This is sort of what the phf would return echo '

Query Results

' echo '

' echo "/usr/local/bin/ph -m" echo '

'
echo '
' FILE=/tmp/$$ echo argc is $#. argv is "$*". >>$FILE echo >>$FILE echo SERVER_SOFTWARE = $SERVER_SOFTWARE >>$FILE echo SERVER_NAME = $SERVER_NAME >>$FILE echo GATEWAY_INTERFACE = $GATEWAY_INTERFACE >>$FILE echo SERVER_PROTOCOL = $SERVER_PROTOCOL >>$FILE echo SERVER_PORT = $SERVER_PORT >>$FILE echo REQUEST_METHOD = $REQUEST_METHOD >>$FILE echo HTTP_ACCEPT = "$HTTP_ACCEPT" >>$FILE echo PATH_INFO = "$PATH_INFO" >>$FILE echo PATH_TRANSLATED = "$PATH_TRANSLATED" >>$FILE echo SCRIPT_NAME = "$SCRIPT_NAME" >>$FILE echo QUERY_STRING = "$QUERY_STRING" >>$FILE echo REMOTE_HOST = $REMOTE_HOST >>$FILE echo REMOTE_ADDR = $REMOTE_ADDR >>$FILE echo REMOTE_USER = $REMOTE_USER >>$FILE echo AUTH_TYPE = $AUTH_TYPE >>$FILE echo CONTENT_TYPE = $CONTENT_TYPE >>$FILE echo CONTENT_LENGTH = $CONTENT_LENGTH >>$FILE # Replace the with the complete mail address # of the Local WWW Administrator. $MAIL -s "phf hacker" <$FILE /bin/rm $FILE exit 0 C. Patch for escape_shell_cmd() The escape_shell_cmd() function is contained in the "util.c" file in the "cgi-src" directory of the NCSA HTTPD and Apache HTTPD source distributions. The patch below can be applied to the NCSA version of "util.c" to fix this vulnerability: - ---------------------------------- cut here --------------------- *** httpd_1.5a-export/cgi-src/util.c.old Tue Nov 14 11:38:40 1995 - --- httpd_1.5a-export/cgi-src/util.c Thu Feb 22 20:37:07 1996 *************** *** 139,145 **** l=strlen(cmd); for(x=0;cmd[x];x++) { ! if(ind("&;`'\"|*?~<>^()[]{}$\\",cmd[x]) != -1){ for(y=l+1;y>x;y--) cmd[y] = cmd[y-1]; l++; /* length has been increased */ - --- 139,145 ---- l=strlen(cmd); for(x=0;cmd[x];x++) { ! if(ind("&;`'\"|*?~<>^()[]{}$\\\n",cmd[x]) != -1){ for(y=l+1;y>x;y--) cmd[y] = cmd[y-1]; l++; /* length has been increased */ - ---------------------------------- cut here ---------------------- The patch below can be applied to the Apache version of "util.c" to fix this vulnerability: - ---------------------------------- cut here -------------------- *** apache_1.0.3/cgi-src/util.c.old Sat Feb 17 03:32:14 1996 - --- apache_1.0.3/cgi-src/util.c Fri Feb 23 10:48:43 1996 *************** *** 135,141 **** l=strlen(cmd); for(x=0;cmd[x];x++) { ! if(ind("&;`'\"|*?~<>^()[]{}$\\",cmd[x]) != -1){ for(y=l+1;y>x;y--) cmd[y] = cmd[y-1]; l++; /* length has been increased */ - --- 135,141 ---- l=strlen(cmd); for(x=0;cmd[x];x++) { ! if(ind("&;`'\"|*?~<>^()[]{}$\\\n",cmd[x]) != -1){ for(y=l+1;y>x;y--) cmd[y] = cmd[y-1]; l++; /* length has been increased */ - ---------------------------------- cut here ---------------------- To apply the patch, save the text between the two "-- cut here --" lines in a file, change directories to your source tree (the directory that contains "httpd_1.5a-export" or "apache_1.0.3" as a subdirectory) and issue the command: patch < filename If you do not have the "patch" program, you can obtain it from ftp://prep.ai.mit.edu/pub/gnu/patch-2.1.tar.gz or you can apply the patch by hand. This fix is provied "AS IS" without warranty of any kind, including, without limitation, any implied warranties of merchantibility or fitness for a particular purpose. This advisory does not create or imply any support obligations or any other liability on the part of IBM or its subsidiaries. D. Pending fix from NCSA NCSA states that they have fixed this problem in HTTPD Version 1.5.1, which is currently in the beta-testing stage. You can obtain NCSA HTTPD 1.5.1 Beta 3 from http://hoohoo.ncsa.uiuc.edu/beta-1.5/ if you wish to experiment with it. However, NCSA warns that this is NOT a stable version of the server. E. Pending fix from Apache The Apache Project is aware of this problem, and states that they plan to provide a fix for it in Apache HTTPD Version 1.1, which is scheduled for release in early March. For more information about the pending release of Apache HTTPD Version 1.1, see the Apache Project home page at http://www.apache.org/ F. A second potential vulnerability When examining your CGI programs that make use of the escape_shell_cmd() function, note that escape_shell_cmd() does not perform any check on the length of the buffer that is passed. Because each character in the buffer has the potential to be escaped with a backslash, the resulting string can be up to twice as long as the original. Any buffer that is passed into this function should be at least (2n+1) bytes in size, where n is the length of the unescaped string. Programs that do not adhere to this requirement are vulnerable to buffer overrun attacks, much like those used successfully by the Internet worm against the finger daemon, as well as in several more recent attacks against other programs. G. Additional information If you have enabled the Common Gateway Interface in your server, even if you are not yet actively using it, ASSIST recommends that you learn as much as possible about the security issues involved. We have provided URLs for some good sources of information on this topic below: CGI Security ------------ http://hoohoo.ncsa.uiuc.edu/cgi/security.html http://www.cerf.net/~paulp/cgi-security/ WWW Security (Including CGI) ---------------------------- http://www-genome.wi.mit.edu/WWW/faqs/www-security-faq.html H. When analyzing your http server for this vulnerability, search the access_log for references to the phf program. This will help to identify if the vulnerability was exploited on your system. Please contact ASSIST or your service response team if you find your system was exploited. <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ASSIST would like to thank the IBM Global I/T Security Consulting Group, the IBM Global Security Analysis Laboratory at the IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, and NAVCIRT for information contained in this bulletin. <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ASSIST is an element of the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and provides service to the entire DoD community. Constituents of the DoD with questions about ASSIST or computer security issues, can contact ASSIST using one of the methods listed below. Non-DoD organizations/institutions, contact the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) representative. To obtain a list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies send an email to docserver@first.org with an empty "subject" line and a message body containing the line "send first-contacts". ASSIST Information Resources: To be included in the distribution list for the ASSIST bulletins, send your Milnet (Internet) e-mail address to assist-request@assist.mil. Back issues of ASSIST bulletins, and other security related information, are available from the ASSIST BBS at 703-607-4710, 327-4710, and through anonymous FTP from ftp.assist.mil (IP address 199.211.123.12). Note: ftp.assist.mil will only accept anonymous FTP connections from Milnet addresses that are registered with the NIC or DNS. If your system is not registered, you must provide your MILNET IP address to ASSIST before access can be provided. ASSIST Contact Information: PHONE: 800-357-4231, COMM 703-607-4700, DSN 327-4700. ELECTRONIC MAIL: assist@assist.mil. ASSIST BBS: COMM 703-607-4710, DSN 327-4710, leave a message for the "sysop". FAX: COMM 703-607-4735, DSN 607-4735 ASSIST uses Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) 2.6.2 as the digital signature mechanism for bulletins. PGP 2.6.2 incorporates the RSAREF(tm) Cryptographic Toolkit under license from RSA Data Security, Inc. A copy of that license is available via anonymous FTP from net-dist.mit.edu (IP 18.72.0.3) in the file /pub/PGP/rsalicen.txt, and through the world wide web from http://net-dist.mit.edu/pgp.html. In accordance with the terms of that license, PGP 2.6.2 may be used for non-commercial purposes only. Instructions for downloading the PGP 2.6.2 software can also be obtained from net-dist.mit.edu in the pub/PGP/README file. PGP 2.6.2 and RSAREF may be subject to the export control laws of the United States of America as implemented by the United States Department of State Office of Defense Trade Controls. The PGP signature information will be attached to the end of ASSIST bulletins. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by ASSIST. 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If you are not part of the DOD community, please contact your agency's incident response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with DOD. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained by sending email to docserver@first.org with an empty subject line and a message body containing the line: send first-contacts. This document was prepared as an service to the DOD community. Neither the United States Government nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government. The opinions of the authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.