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Security Bulletin 9729 DISA Defense Communications System
December 8, 1997 Published by: DISN Security Coordination Center
(SCC@NIC.MIL) 1-(800) 365-3642
The DISN SECURITY BULLETIN is distributed by the DISN SCC (Security Coordination Center) under DISA contract as a means of communicating information on network and host security exposures, fixes, and concerns to security and management personnel at DISN facilities. Back issues may be obtained via FTP from NIC.MIL [207.132.116.5] using login= "anonymous" and password="guest". The bulletin pathname is scc/sec-yynn (where "yy" is the year the bulletin is issued and "nn" is a bulletin number, e.g. scc/sec-9705.txt). These are also available at our WWW site, http://nic.mil.
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! The following important advisory was issued by the Computer !
! Emergency Response Team (CERT) and is being relayed unedited !
! via the Defense Information Systems Agency's Security !
! Coordination Center distribution system as a means of !
! providing DISN subscribers with useful security information. !
! !
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Last revised:
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The text of this advisory was originally released on December 5, 1997, as AA-97.29, developed by the Australian Computer Emergency Response Team. To more widely broadcast this information, we are reprinting the AUSCERT advisory here with their permission. Only the contact information at the end has changed: AUSCERT contact information has been replaced with CERT/CC contact information.
We will update this advisory as we receive additional information.
Look for it in an "Updates" section at the end of the advisory.
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AUSCERT has received information that a vulnerability exists in the statd(1M) program, available on a variety of Unix platforms.
This vulnerability may allow local users, as well as remote users to gain root privileges.
Exploit information involving this vulnerability has been made publicly available.
This vulnerability is different to the statd vulnerability described in CERT/CC advisory CA-96.09.
The vulnerability in statd affects various vendor versions of statd. AUSCERT recommends that sites take the steps outlined in section 3 as soon as possible.
This advisory will be updated as more information becomes available.
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AUSCERT has received information concerning a vulnerability in some vendor versions of the RPC server, statd(1M).
statd provides network status monitoring. It interacts with lockd to provide crash and recovery functions for the locking services on NFS.
Due to insufficient bounds checking on input arguments which may be supplied by local users, as well as remote users, it is possible to overwrite the internal stack space of the statd program while it is executing a specific rpc routine. By supplying a carefully designed input argument to the statd program, intruders may be able to force statd to execute arbitrary commands as the user running statd. In most instances, this will be root.
This vulnerability may be exploited by local users. It can also be exploited remotely without the intruder requiring a valid local account if statd is accessible via the network.
Sites can check whether they are running statd by:
On system V like systems:
On BSD like systems:
# ps -auxw |grep statd
root 156 0.0 0.0 52 0 ? IW May 3 0:00 rpc.statd
Specific vendor information regarding this vulnerability can be found in Section 3.
This vulnerability permits attackers to gain root privileges. It can be exploited by local users. It can also be exploited remotely without the intruder requiring a valid local account if statd is accessible via the network.
The statd program is available on many different systems. As vendor patches are made available sites are encouraged to install them immediately (Section 3.1).
If you are not using NFS in your environment then there is no need for the statd program to be running and it can be disabled (Section 3.2).
The following vendors have provided information concerning the vulnerability in statd.
Specific vendor information has been placed in Appendix A.
If the statd program is required at your site and your vendor is not listed, you should contact your vendor directly.
If you do not require the statd program then it should be disabled (Section 3.2).
The statd daemon is required as part of an NFS environment. If you are not using NFS there is no need for this program and it can be disabled. The statd (or rpc.statd) program is often started in the system initialisation scripts (such as /etc/rc* or /etc/rc*.d/*).
If you do not require statd it should be commented out from the initialisation scripts. In addition, any currently running statd should be identified using ps(1) and then terminated using kill(1).
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The following information regarding this vulnerability for specific vendor versions of statd has been made available to AUSCERT. For additional information, sites should contact their vendors directly.
No versions of BSD/OS are vulnerable to this problem.
At the time of writing this document, patches (binary kits) are in progress and final testing has been completed. Distribution of the fix for this problem is expected to begin soon. Digital will provide notice of the completion/availability of the patches through AES services (WEB, DIA, DSNlink) and be available from your normal Digital Support channel.
DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORPORATION 12/97
This problem is in the investigation process.
AIX 3.2 and 4.1 are vulnerable to the statd buffer overflow. However, the buffer overflow described in this advisory was fixed when the APARs for CERT CA-96.09 was released. See the appropriate release below to determine your action.
Apply the following fix to your system:
To determine if you have this PTF on your system, run the following
command:
lslpp -lB U441411
Apply the following fix to your system:
To determine if you have this PTF on your system, run the following
command:
instfix -ik IX55931
Or run the following command:
lslpp -h bos.net.nfs.client
Your version of bos.net.nfs.client should be 4.1.4.7 or later.
No APAR required. Fix already contained in the release.
APARs may be ordered using Electronic Fix Distribution (via
FixDist) or from the IBM Support Center. For more information on FixDist, reference URL:
http://service.software.ibm.com/aixsupport/
or send e-mail to aixserv@austin.ibm.com with a subject of "FixDist".
IBM and AIX are registered trademarks of International Business
Machines Corporation.
NetBSD is not vulnerable to the statd buffer overflow. It does not ship with NFS locking programs (statd/lockd).
Red Hat Linux is not vulnerable to the statd buffer overflow. No versions of Red Hat Linux include statd in any form.
The statd vulnerability has been fixed by the following patches:
SunOS version Patch Id
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5.5.1 104166-02
5.5.1_x86 104167-02
5.5 103468-03
5.5_x86 103469-03
5.4 102769-04
5.4_x86 102770-04
4.1.4 102516-06
4.1.3_U1 101592-09
SunOS 5.6 and 5.6_x86 are not vulnerable to this problem.
The vulnerability described in this advisory is not the same as that described in Sun Security Bulletin #135.
Sun recommended and security patches (including checksums) are available from:
http://sunsolve.sun.com/sunsolve/pubpatches/patches.html
AUSCERT maintains a local mirror of Sun recommended and security patches at:
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/mirrors/sunsolve1.sun.com/
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AUSCERT thanks Peter Marelas (The Fulcrum Consulting Group), Tim MacKenzie (The Fulcrum Consulting Group) and CERT/CC for their assistance in the preparation of this advisory.
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If you believe that your system has been compromised,
contact the CERT Coordination Center or your representative in
the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (see http://www.first.org/team-info/)
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Email cert@cert.org
Phone +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
CERT personnel answer 8:30-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4)
and are on call for emergencies during other hours.
Fax +1 412-268-6989
We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email. We can support a shared DES key or PGP. Contact the CERT/CC for more information.
ftp://info.cert.org/pub/CERT_PGP.key
CERT publications and other security information are available from
CERT advisories and bulletins are also posted on the USENET newsgroup
comp.security.announce
To be added to our mailing list for advisories and bulletins, send
email to
cert-advisory-request@cert.org
In the subject line, type
SUBSCRIBE your-email-address
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Copyright 1997 Carnegie Mellon University. Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information can be found in http://www.cert.org/legal_stuff.html and ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/legal_stuff . If you do not have FTP or web access, send mail to cert@cert.org with "copyright" in the subject line.
*CERT is registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
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This file: ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-97.26.statd
http://www.cert.org
click on "CERT Advisories"
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PLEASE NOTE: Some users outside of the DOD computing communities may receive DISN Security Bulletins. If you are not part of the DOD community, please contact your agency's incident response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with DOD. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained by sending email to docserver@first.org with an empty subject line and a message body containing the line: send first-contacts.
This document was prepared as an service to the DOD
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